
Shary Charlotte Henriette Pattipeilohy¹ & Hanafi Rais²

Abstract

Objective of the research entitled “Typology and Causes of Post Conflict Violence in Aceh (2005-2012)” is to explain the characteristics and causes of post conflict violence in Aceh. Even though the separatist violence in Aceh was ended in 2005, but violent conflict in Aceh continues to increase and is often concentrated in the pre MoU conflict area. In war situations, actions of violence have been institutionalized and it will not be easily stopped even after the peace agreement was signed. War has also changed everything: education, informal skill, and ex combatant’s job. The lack of education and informal skills, has led to the criminal inertia actions by ex-GAM members. The lost of mutual trust between police enforcement and ex-GAM member also crates tension between both actors. The second causes is peace induced. If the war has changed the habits and behavior of the people of Aceh to the dominance of violence, the peace treaty seeks to change the behavior, attitudes and contradictions of actors involved by using Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs. Issues and problems began to emerge in the long term process of reintegration programs.

Keywords: Post conflict violence, tipology, causes, Aceh, MoU

Introduction

Aceh has become an interesting area for any national, even international scholars of peace and conflict resolution. Aceh has also become a symbol of successful conflict resolution, since former UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Australia John Howard, and even Nelson Mandela incessantly praised the successful resolution of three decade-armed conflict in Aceh.

¹ International Relations Department, Diponegoro University, Indonesia. Building A, 2nd floor, Prof H. Soedarto, SH street, Tembalang, Semarang, 50275. Phone: +62-24-746 5407, Cell Phone: +62857-4312-5995, Email: infoir@live.undip.ac.id or charlotte_pattipeilohy@yahoo.com
²International Relations Department, Gadjah Mada University, Bulaksumur, Yogyakarta 55281. Phone: +62274 563362 ext 210, Email: hi.fisipol@ugm.ac.id
Suddenly, the Government of Indonesia who had been known as the one who is responsible for the exacerbation of conflict in Aceh after 1998, became a peace role model and honored by international actors. In 2006, Koffi Annan said Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had succeed to transform the "tragedy" of the tsunami into "an opportunity" to build peace in Aceh. British Prime Minister, Tony Blair emphasized Aceh as an "example and expectation of reconciliation", while Nelson Mandela praised Indonesia as "a powerful nation in the global effort to create a better world for mankind". All of these praises are reasonable. The increasing of the intensity and quantity of internal conflicts around the globe, as an effect of the end of Cold War era, is not accompanied by the increasing number of peaceful conflict resolutions. In some cases, these conflicts became a Protracted Social Conflict (Azar, 2010) and manifested into actions of crimes against humanity's (as happened in Rwanda, Sudan, and Bosnia). The world and the largest peace organization such as the United Nations seemed to be exhausted by these unresolved civil wars.

Aceh’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that signed on August 15th 2005, appeared to give a hope for peace and conflict studies. Since 2005, hundreds of local and foreign researchers flock to Aceh just to watch and learn about its peace building process. Not only at the individual level, foreign countries also interested in learning how Aceh and the Government of Indonesia could manage the sustainable peace in Aceh. In 2010, for example, the government of Nepal was very keen to learn the patterns of conflict resolution and handling of reintegration in Aceh. Apparently, this country felt that Aceh could be used as a prototype of the ongoing peace building in Nepal since 2006. This country has struggled to stop the conflict between the Maoists and the government of Nepal. In March 2012, the Thai government also learns from Aceh to resolve conflict in southern Thailand that has worsened since the reign of Thaksin Shinawatra. Apparently, not only countries in Asia who has a great enthusiasm to learn about the process of peace building in Aceh. In 2009, 29 Sudan’s delegation also visited Indonesia to study how the government of Indonesia could handling the peace and reconciliation process in Aceh. However, is it true that Aceh is now in a peace condition without the appearance of any violent conflict?
Background and Research Question

In January 2012, we were surprised by the shooting incident that occurred in two areas in East Aceh: Blangcot and Sureuke. Since New Year's Eve 2012, Aceh faced serious shootings incidents in three different areas: the first is in Simpang Ilie, Banda Aceh that killed one person, a shopkeeper named Wagino; second in Blangcot Village, District Jeumpa, Bireun District; and the last shooting is at PT Telkom muss quarry workers. Officials began to analyze the problem: the police stated that it is purely criminal, Governor of Aceh and Menkopolhukam Joko Suyanto stated that these incidents caused by some economic problems. But then Joko Suyanto said that the shooting was related to the elections in Aceh that will be held on February 2012. These shooting incidents remind us how Aceh’s election period is associated to the occurrence of violent conflicts. Violence and criminal actions seemed to become a “habit” before and after the Election Day. In 2007, just a few months after the election, dozens of aggression to the local authorities occurred and almost endangered the peace situation in Aceh. Some of the examples are: the grenade attack to the head of Parliament (in Pidie), the office district (in Central Aceh), and the regent (in Bireuen), a bomb attack on the office of regent Kutacane, attempted arson to a new regent in Bambel and Badr, until the attack on the convoy of Vice Regent Bireuen. All of these cases occurred in August 2007. Apparently, these events are just a fractions of many other violence cases happened during the democratic process in Aceh. These violence actions raised an interesting question: Why violences still emerged in Aceh, even after the Memorandum of Understanding is already signed?

Theoretical Framework

The term of “Post Conflict Violence”, has three key words: (1) the post-conflict, (2) post-conflict violence and (3) violence. The first key word describes the Post Conflict situations, environments and contexts after the peace agreement is signed. Post conflict will be very closely related to the processes and peacebuilding programs. Type of violence in this thesis, refers to the definition and typology of violence (direct violence) by Johan Galtung. After understanding the Post Conflict and Violence, eventually we will arrive at a deeper understanding about the term post-conflict violence, from typologies of violence, untill the causes of its. The term post-conflict often trapped us into a common perception that the conflict has ended and replaced by peace, or to equate "conflict" to "war" and "post-conflict" to "peace".
In this dichotomy, "conflict" signifies a situation dominated by violence, while "post-conflict" implicitly to signal the end of violence and turned to peaceful normality. Unfortunately, the state of "peace" or "normal" is not precise enough to describe the post-conflict situation. In post-conflict situations, the intensity of the conflict is much reduced; the conflict also becomes less real or less latent, but rarely stops at all: "There are few truly post-conflict situations. Conflicts Become more or less violent, more or less manifest or latent, but they seldom stop altogether "(Junne, 2005; Licklider, 1995). Violent conflict that appeared on peacebuilding period has different terminologies, some identify it as post-conflict violence (Dewhurst, 2008), peacetime violence (Autesserre, nd), post-conflict risks (Collier et.al, 2006; Preston, 2011), post-conflict armed violence (Suhrke and Berdal, 2011), or post-conflict vulnerability (Ahmed and Gassmann, 2009). Séverine Autesserre (nd) used the term to criticize the strategy of peacebuilding which often creates violent conflicts in post-conflict environments. Ahmed and Gassmann (2009) views that the post-conflict situation characterized by the loss of functional capacity of issues such as Human Security, Exchange freedom, Sense of belonging, and Access. People in post conflict situation also lose the capability or the ability to earn a living, to maintain living standards, access and use of productive resources, and interact with others. Moreover, Chaudhary and Suhrke (2008) give a comprehensive typology of post-conflict violence. They divided types of post conflict violence into five categories: political violence, routine state violence, Economy crime-related violence, community and informal justice, and post-war property-related disputes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Violence</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political Violence</td>
<td>Assassinations, bomb attacks, kidnappings, torture, genocide, mass displacements, riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine state violence</td>
<td>Violent law enforcement activities, encounter killings, social cleansing operations, routine torture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic and crime-related violence</td>
<td>Armed robbery, extortions, kidnappings for ransom, control of markets through violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and informal justice and policing</td>
<td>Lynching, vigilante action, mob justice</td>
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This typology will then help us to understand the causes of post conflict violence. In situations of war, actions of violence have been institutionalized (Waldmann, 2002) and it will not be easily stopped even after the peace agreement was signed.
Wulf (2012) noted that the transition from war to a peace, is not provide immediate change of the violent behavior into cooperation, behavioral steal into workers, repression to democracy, or change the people who are immune to the law to be more responsible: "A 'transition from war to peace' is unlikely to see a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production, from repression to democracy, or from impunity to accountability."

**Conflict and Peace in Aceh**

Violence in Aceh had begun even before the European colonialism era. However, it can not be denied that colonialism gave a big hand in the creation of systematic violence in Indonesia. Historical evidence suggests that the Aceh War lasted for four decades (1871-1910) had led to the deaths of 100,000 people, of which 75,000 of them are people of Aceh (Alfian, 2005). Violence in Aceh was also greatly influenced by cultural aspects, especially the traditional narrative saga that creates a collective memory among the people of Aceh. In this saga, the person who died in the war, would have seven virtues, such as atonements, go to heaven, escapes from the apocalypse, even the atonement of sins for 70 relatives (Alfian, 2005). Even though violence has lasted for a long time, but the resistance violence was just started on 1953 by the uprising of DI/TII group and the emergence of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 1976.

The conflict in Aceh actually has a continuity causes, but also has discontinuities settlement, where a different president, would resolve the Aceh problem in a different way as well (Adam in Basyar, 2008). If we look back at the history of conflict in Aceh, then we are able to understand, that both approaches of peace and security (Galtung), had been used by the government, to bring lasting peace in Aceh. Although both approaches aim to create peace, however, the result of the application of the two approaches is really different. When security approach is merely exacerbating GAM rebellion, the peace approach on the contrary, brings them to the Helsinki agreement. Since Hassan Tiro announced the formation of GAM on December 4, 1976 (even though this new movement was established in May 20, 1977), the government conducted a series of military operations to suppress insurgent groups considered this (evil parties). GOI even reluctant to solve this issue amicably, and prefer the military as a way out.
We can analyze the conflict in Aceh by six periods: two periods of the Suharto government (Bhakti, 2008, Q15), which from 1976 to 1979 (the beginning of the formation of GAM to Hasan Tiro exile to Sweden), 1989-1998 (GAM insurgency against the government center), and the four stages of the Habibie government, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati and Yudhoyono (Basyar, 2008, pp. 16-19).

1. Security Approach

In the first period, the government launched Military Intelligence Operation, and successfully quelled the GAM resistance, Hasan Tiro even had pushed to Sweden. In the second period, the GAM resistance was growing stronger, because many GAM members had been trained in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Libya. To counter the growing militias, GOI launched Military Operations Area / DOM in Aceh. Approximately 1,258 to 2,000 people were killed during the military operation. In the third period, the Habibie government, the government failed to prevent the rise of GAM’s armed struggle, for some reason (ICG, 2001): (1) the forced repatriation of 545 illegal immigrants, including GAM sympathizers, from a detention camp in Malaysia in June 1998, (2) the use of arbitrary violence by TNI / police (who have reformed) to disperse demonstrators and GAM retaliate. In the period of the Wahid government, despite going dialogue with GAM humanitarian pause on June 2 until January 15, 2001, however, at the same time, President Wahid was increasing security forces to restore law and order, and turn out into the increase of violence actions in Aceh (ICG, 2001). In early March 2001, the government approves a limited military operation in Aceh, just because Exxon Mobil gas fields were closed due to GAM attacked (Basyar, 2008). The conflict in Aceh has not shed some light in the Megawati era, she even gave a negative responses in May 2003, after the failure of The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). In fact, GAM negotiators were arrested and sentenced to prison. Martial Law was held on May 19, 2003. Thousands of military personnel / police were sent back to Aceh to defeat GAM (Fahmi, 2010).

2. Peace Approach

Peace approach was implemented in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era, where civil emergency status was later replaced by the Civil Code on May 19, 2005. Small amount of gunfire is still occurred but still not harassed the implementation of peace agreement. Facilitated by Martii Atthisari, negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian was held in Helsinki, Finland.
After a grueling five-round dialogue, which is chaired by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of Indonesia, Hamid Awaluddin and GAM chaired by Prime Minister Malik Mahmud, an agreement was reached on August 15, 2005, two days before the anniversary of the proclamation of independence of Indonesia (Aceh Institute Press, 2010, pp.19-20).

Aceh Reintegration Process

Since the signing of the MoU in Helsinki on August 15, 2005, Aceh was entering the stage of post-settlement peacebuilding, which refers to the framework of conflict resolution that are applicable internationally and has been adopted in the MoU, the demobilization program, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). By using this DDR framework, the first stage was done by disarm and demobilized the armed forces, only then can begin the process of reintegration of former combatants. If the process of disarmament and demobilization is failed, then reintegration process can not be executed properly. Aceh Reintegration program is aimed to regain the former combatants citizenship status, as well as their political, social and economic access as an Indonesian citizens (Bhakti, 2008). Therefore, there should be a harmony and continuity between the economic, political and social reintegration programs because even though combatants have been granted access to politics and government, without the economic and social support, the political reintegration will be failed. For example, how ex-combatants can be reintegrated into the society if they do not have a decent job or any capital capability for their survival? How can they participate in the decision making process when their basic needs are not met properly? Therefore, the alignment of these three areas is needed. The first efforts to implement the GAM’s political reintegration is to disperse TNA (Tentara Negara Aceh/Aceh Army) as the armed forces, and replace it with another organization that can be used as a political vehicle by former GAM combatants. After the MoU, 2 types of organizations were formed to replace GAM: one for the command and the political side. On the organization of the command, they form two institutions designed as an organization transition, namely Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA) and the National Assembly (MN). On the political side, they form local parties that can accommodate the political aspirations of former GAM combatants.
1. National Assembly (Majelis Nasional/ MN)

In the third week of October 2005, GAM formed a National Assembly at the Eagles Hotel, Banda Aceh, which was attended by almost all GAM senior members in Aceh. The meeting also set out the organizational structure as follows: First, Teungku Usman Lampoh Awe was appointed as the chairman and due to his closest relation to Hasan di Tiro (founder GAM), Lampoh Awe is a highly respected figure among GAM members. Second, Muzakkir Manaf, was appointed as head of security affairs. It means that the position of the former GAM armed forces (TNA) will be under the command of National Assembly. Third, Zakaria Saman Karim was appointed as the head of political affairs, and Elias Abid selected as the head of economic affairs (ICG, 2005). The National Assembly is the highest body that gathered every economic and political power of GAM (Nurchasim, 2008), and responsible to decide any political action, including the preparation of the elections in 2006 (ICG, 2005). The tasks and responsibilities of the National Assembly are:

1. to determine the political strategy for the election
2. allocating reintegration aids
3. to establish a good relations with the European Union, represented by the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)
4. to participate in advocacy related to MoU through the MoU socialization secretariat.
5. Designing a new organizational structure of Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA)

2. Aceh Transitional Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh / KPA)

KPA was established in in December 2005, led by Muzakir Manaf, a former commander of the Army Neugara Aceh (TNA), which aimed to oversee the former combatants and Aceh’s transition process. The structure of KPA is very unique, because the command system of KPA is exactly the same as the GAM’s. For instance, the KPA representation at the provincial level is filled by the former commander of GAM / GAM elite, while the district and sub-district level is filled by the GAM. In other words, GAM as a social-political movement still exist, only their armed forces are dissolved (Nurchasim, 2008).
3. Aceh Party (Partai Aceh / PA)

The second command structure is the Aceh Party (PA). The Aceh Party was established by Malik Mahmud in 2008 to ensure GAM’s involvement in 2009 elections and officially led by Muzakkir Manaf. Ranks of the PA leadership were filled by a loyal devotee of Malik Mahmud, but at the local level, PA is highly controlled by the KPA. PA also has enormous economic resources from some provinces that have a business relation with former GAM members. Bireun for example, this province is providing around 20% of their profits to the Aceh Party. The same amount is also applied to other GAM’s former headquarter provinces, especially in eastern coastal areas. It should be noted that not all PA members is a former GAM combatants, because the PA also recruited civilian members who have higher education than the former combatants. In addition, not all members of the KPA and the former combatants joined the PA, Sofyan Daud, a leader of KPA, for example, he joined with one of the national parties, the Democrat Party and became one of the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s campaign team members in 2009. Aceh Party also has better information network which has developed during the conflict era. So when its competitors released a counterattack, PA immediately gathered the media, NGOs and the diplomatic community to "prove" that they are "victims" of the other party’s attack. Party competitors who do not have strong information network PA, of course, difficult to respond to these allegations, and especially to defend themselves (ICG, 2009).

4. Stakeholders

The peace process would not work properly without any cooperation and coordination among the decision-makers (stakeholders). Basyar (2008) categorized Aceh’s stakeholders as follows: First, Aceh Reintegration Body (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh/ BRA). BRA was established on February 15, 2006 as an initiative of the central government through the Presidential Instruction No. 15 year 2005 (Basyar, 2008). BRA main tasks are: (1) to reunite the various elements of the Acehnese people who have drifted apart due to conflict with religious approaches, educational, social, political and cultural, as well as (2) break the chain cycle of conflict through economic approach (Bhakti, 2008).
Second, Aceh’s Communication and Coordination Forum for Peace (Forum komunikasi dan Koordinasi Damai Aceh/ FKK). FKK was formed by the central government on 18 April 2007 as a combination of representatives from Ministry of Home Affairs, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, National Development Planning Agency, and also permanent and non-permanent members of the GAM. FKK is criticized by some NGOs in Aceh because almost all FKK members are representatives of the central government, and feared that this membership will only accommodate the interests of the central government. Moreover, the FKK chairman Amiruddin Brig Usman who is a member of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), further adds to the suspicion of activists and NGOs in Aceh (Basyar, 2008).

Third, Joint Forum (Forum Bersama/ FORBES). FORBES was established by Governor SK No: 330/ 145/ 2007 with the following functions:

1. Optimizing information dissemination among stakeholders (interested parties) as well as maintain uniformity vision regarding the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding as well as the challenges to be faced in the process;
2. To provide a mechanism to resolve the problem and together;
3. to provide support for the implementation of the coordination and planning related to the transition from conflict to peace conditions.

Fourth, CoSPA (Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh). CoSPA was formed on February 14, 2008, and facilitated by FKK. CoSPA’s task is to arrange regular monthly meetings between the representatives of Indonesia in FKK and the GAM. This meeting discussed all issues related to the peace process in Aceh.

Fifth, Independent Election Commission (Komite Independen Pemilu/ KIP) is part of the General Elections Commission (KPU) authorities hold election of President / Vice President, Members of Parliament Elections / DPRA / DPRK, as well as local elections and Deputy Head (Election) in Aceh. The “independence” of KIP here means as an inherent nature of the institution that can not be intervened by any other parties.
Pattern and Tipology of Post Conflict Violence in Aceh

The separatist violence in Aceh was ended in 2005, but post conflict violence in continues to increase and is often concentrated in the pre MoU conflict area. Since 2005, the level of violence in Aceh is much fluctuated. In 2006, there were 193 incidents of violent conflict, and increased to 468 incidents in 2008 (Kontras, 2011). The majority of incidents in post-MoU apparently took place in the same district that experienced the highest rates of violence on the separatist conflict, especially Bireuen, North Aceh and East Aceh. Pre-MoU, Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe is included in the minimal level of violence, because of the high level of presence of Indonesian security forces, but in the post-conflict period, these regions became increasing violent acts (Multi Donor Fund, 2010). Levels of violence increased dramatically in 2009, with 25 cases of violence, including bombings, arsons, party attributes vandalisms, intimidations, tortures, shootings and killings, with at least 7 people died that year. Meanwhile, in 2010, the rate of violence is not much changed, there are at least 16 shooting victims and two murder victims in Aceh (Kontras, 2011). From the data published by conflict and development program, post conflict violence in Aceh focused on areas such as Aceh Besar, East Aceh, North Aceh, Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, Bireun and Pidie. During the conflict, these areas are controlled by the GAM. Great Aceh, North Aceh and East Aceh are the GAM’s first territorial expansion in 1986-1989, that started since the return of combatants who were trained in Libya. GAM Recruitment in this region tends to be much easier, because the Acehnese are the dominant tribe.

Then, GAM began to expand its territory expansion into other areas in 1999, following the fall of the New Order. Until the year 2003, a total of 2365 members of GAM were in Pidie, around 1331 members in North Aceh, 826 in East Aceh, West Aceh’s 472 members, 323 members in Aceh Besar, 89 members in Central Aceh, and 25 members in Southeast Aceh (Schulze, 2004). After the MoU, the number of ex-combatants scattered in some areas, especially in North Aceh, Bireun, East Aceh, Pidie, South Aceh and West Aceh. This thesis is then divided typology of violence in Aceh in several types by using Chaudhary and Suhrke’s theory: political violence, economy related violence, state routine violence, and Community/informal justice and policing. First, political violence.
Political violence can be defined as any violent behavior aimed to gain or/and maintaining political power. Aceh elections in 2006 and 2012 have shown how former combatants and political violence is still related to each other. The type of violence is also quite diverse, ranging from just a mere threat, assault and attempted murder during the campaign, to the shootings, arsons, and grenades thrown. Not only happened in the upcoming elections, an old issue such as the division of ALA ABAS province has also led to violence. ALA or Aceh Leuser Antara will consist of Central Aceh district, Bener Meriah, Aceh Singkil, Gayo Lues and East Aceh, while ABAS or Aceh Barat Selatan, will consist of Aceh Jaya district, West Aceh, Nagan Raya, Southwest Aceh, South Aceh and Simeulue. This division turned into a number of violent conflicts occurred in Central Aceh, known as the Atu Lintang Incident, and the kidnapping of Mukhlis Gayo.

The Atu Lintang incident started from a clash incident in Takengon on February 29, 2008, between the KPA and the members of the Association of Terminal Workers (IPT), an organization dominated by former anti-separatist militia members. Unexpectedly, the next KPA Mege Sagoe’s office in the village Meurah Pupok, Atu Lintang district, Central Aceh, was attacked and burned by a group of people (who allegedly members IPT). As a result of this incident, five members of KPA killed and one seriously injured (World Bank / DSF, 2008a, pp.1-2). Second, the violence committed by state officials such as the police and military. A number of acts of violence such as beatings, torture, kidnapping and detention without legal proceedings, is part of routine state violence. Often, the act of violence was followed by violent retaliation by the former rebels against police officers. In May 2007, a construction worker who was imprisoned for helping GAM during the conflict era, was abducted by the police and interrogated for 5 hours. He reported that his torturers asked him about GAM armory locations. Third, economic-related conflict. This conflict can be classified into two types: (1) violence related to conflict and post-tsunami relief and (2) natural resource-related conflict. After the peace agreement and tsunami disaster, million dollars of economic assistance was given to Aceh. Approximately U.S. $ 365.6 million has been allocated for post-conflict recovery program: U.S. $ 173.5 million from the Government of Indonesia and the Government of Aceh, and U.S. $ 192.1 million from international donors and NGOs. This means that about U.S. $ 320 for each conflict victim or about seven percent of the per capita expenditure for tsunami victims.
These financial supports, have become a major source of post conflict violence in Aceh. Between 2005 and 2008 there were nearly 1,000 conflict-related in Aceh, where about 3 percent (33 incidents) led to violence:

1. conflict over tsunami aid (more than 600 incidents, 17 were turned into violence),
2. post-conflict assistance (more than 100 incidents, with 6 violence incidents),
3. program aimed to soften the impact of the national fuel subsidy removal (40 incidents, 6 of violence incidents),
4. conflict related to others government programs (200 incidents, 7 violence incidents).

Many ex-combatants are now being a "private security force" for national and international companies in Aceh. Sometimes, it's their job to use violence to solve conflicts, especially conflicts with local communities. Illegal logging is also a fertile ground for extortion and violent conflict in Aceh, as happened in May 2007 in in Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah. Fourth, the violence perpetrated by the community. Violence in Aceh is not only done by members of the police or military, even KPA as a community, often commit acts of violence against civilians for information, projects, and various other interests.

Causes of Post Conflict Violence in Aceh

By using Autesserre thinking, post-conflict violence in Aceh can be explained in two theoretical framework: War Induced Causes of Violence and Peace Induced Causes of Violence. First, the War Induced Causes of Violence. War has changed everything. Civilians who previously worked as farmers, fishermen, driver, carpenter, freelancers, and traders, were forced to take up arms and join as a member of GAM. Some are driven by idealism to liberate Aceh from "Javanese colonialism", but some just want a better income by being GAM combatants. Many of them also leave formal education, from elementary to high school. In fact very few combatants who are high school graduates and almost none have a university degree. They prefer to sharpen their forces in other countries like Libya, and consider GAM as part of their job. After the peace agreement, civilians are often loose their skill to work, whereas most of former combatants were in the productive age. As a result, many former combatants are now unemployed and became the major cause of violence in Aceh. In addition, the conflict has also made a deep wound, both for the perpetrators and the victims.
The loss of mutual trust is an issue that must be faced by post-conflict societies, and resulted in violence between the KPA and the Police. Second, Peace Induced Causes of Violence. If the war has changed the habits and behavior of to the dominance of violence, the peace treaty seeks to change the behavior, attitudes and contradictions through a number of peacebuilding program: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The short and medium term program such as disarmament and demobilization is relatively non-problematic. Issues and problems began to emerge in the long term process of reintegration programs. Reintegration program, initiated by Aceh Reintegration Agency (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh/ BRA) has many problems, ranging from its grand design, to the implementation. Undeniably, the reintegration program aims to blend or merge the former GAM combatants into civilian life, so the fragmentation between ex-combatants and civil society will be lost. But rather than merge, post-political reintegration is severely made a sharp difference between ex-combatants and civil society. The ex-combatants themselves are unwilling to change their identity from "freedom fighters" to "civilians", because of their identity as a former TNA (now KPA) actually provides great benefits, ranging from network-related patronage in the political system, power and privilege.

The political reintegration and metamorphosis of the TNA into KPA also has some major problem, because KPA can not identify as a political party, as a result this organization can not be regulated by national legislative framework. If only KPA is a political party, then all behavior can be regulated according to the Law for the Political Parties (Basyar, 2008). Consequently, KPA is still freely use its military power to gain its politics will. So there should be more effort to turn the KPA as a political force that can be regulated by law. Finally, the violence in Aceh was also caused by a lack of coordination and the ability of stakeholders, such as: monitoring elections remains low; investigation and violations of election disputes ineffective; there are indications of a less neutral election official, and some key procedures were not implemented, such as control procedures for the campaign funds. Later, these weaknesses will have an impact on the political conflict and affect the efforts to establish a good governance in Aceh. In addition, high number of violations and the stakeholder's inability to resolve problems effectively has raised disappointment among elite factions, and has reduced the legitimacy of winning candidates. On the other hand, because of the poor implementation of campaign finance regulations, the public and civil society (civil society) has lost a powerful instrument to verify government's future accountability. This may impact the efforts to build a clean government and effective policy-making in Aceh.
From the above discussion, we can see the relation between the actors, stakeholders, typology and causes of violence in post-conflict Aceh in the following chart:
6. References


