

## The Role of Informal Institutions in Conflict: an Assessment Study in Swat, Pakistan

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### Abstract

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This paper examines the role of informal institutions in the conflict of Swat, Pakistan. Swat conflict was a major militant conflict which aroused as a result of Talibanization in the region. The study depicts that how did informal institutions such as Jirga (elders' assembly), Jumat (Mosque) and Hujra (community center) play their role during Swat conflict? The study used qualitative approach such as in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) to deeply analyze the role of the Jirga, Jumat and Hujra. However, the study reveals that Jumat supported the Taliban and militants to destabilize peace and harmony in Swat district. The Jumat (Mosque) played a major role to intensify the degree of conflict; Jumat had supported and helped militancy rather than to resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, the role of Jumat was instrumental to fuel and support conflict situation. Taliban (militants) used Madressah (Jumat) for the propagation of conflict agenda, and to gain local supports. Keeping in view the findings, the study suggests that there is a need to formulate comprehensive laws and rules to supervise Jumat and Madressah to make them accountable to formal rules and procedures

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**Keywords:** Informal Institutions, Swat Conflict, Jirga, Jumat, Hujra Khans

### 1. Introduction

Informal institutions' analysis completely a novel phenomenon and has become the prime theme for different studies such as economics, political science and sociology. Informal institutions have a visible role in mitigating economic, social and even political as well as religious issues.

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Being an important part of society, informal institutions play an effective role in resolving conflicts and solving complex issues, where formal mechanism, e.g. police and other law enforcing agencies failed to provide public security and to resolve conflict. Informal institutions generally acceptable and has more functional role in those societies where day to day interactions are not shaped under formal rules and regulations. The level of various developmental dimensions i.e. political, economic and social determine whether human interaction be shaped under formal or informal rules and regulations.

Institutions are rules and procedures that are devised by individuals of the society. The purpose behind them is to nurture human interactions and most importantly to eliminate uncertainty by providing a structure to human life. Institutions are similar to the games' rules of a society (North, 1990) that are attached to as well hold back people's way of life and other societal controlling mechanism. Basically institutions are social tools to resolve or overcome social dilemmas and to influence the present and future of a society.

Since uncertainty as a major component of individuals' life; while living in a community where uncertainty prevails, people create or formulate guiding principles and strategies to smoothly run or control their daily matters in the presence of uncertainty (Jutting and Soysa, 2006). Institutional constraints may be created or evolved, their aim is to provide framework within, which human interaction take place in an effective and smooth way. Now a days, in the era of uncertainty, the saying "institution matter for peace building and development" has received deep attention (Jutting and Soysa, 2006).

Actually this preposition truly means that designed rules and procedures that constructed or shaped by local authority or people that matter at a time of uncertainty and maintaining harmony and peace in the society. The concept of rule is central one in analyzing and understanding the functions and procedures of institutions (Ostrom, 2005). In institutional analysis, the term rule means an effective strategy for how to solve or resolve the problem. There are different methods of categorizing institution-according to their pace of change, the field to which they belonged such as social, political, economy or cultural, and their originality such as formal or informal (Jutting , 2003).

The term "informal institutions role in conflict" is the main theme of this study so the study's main focus is the role of informal institutions in conflict situation, in other words, it means that what sort of role the local or indigenous institutions have at the time of local non-violent conflicts and as well as violent conflict.

### **1.1 An Overview of Rural Pakistan**

The rural economies of Pakistan featured with high growth rate of population, low literacy and very poor living standard of the local residencies. It is estimated that about 75 % of population lives in rural setting; majority of them living below the poverty line and having no strategies and facilities to overcome the risks associated with their living on daily basis (Economic Survey, 2009). As compared to urban population the social life of rural population is completely deprived from basic facilities such as education, health and infrastructure.

The economy of rural population is still traditional and wholly depends on livestock and agriculture. Household size of rural setting is much bigger than the urban setting, so dependency rate in rural is higher than the urban setting. For the sustainable rural development in Pakistan, rural population not only facing institutional constraints but also dearth the needed resources to achieve the developmental goal. In rural setup, Formal Institutions are reluctant or weak to facilitate the rural population in their day to day matters, as their social and cultural norms and values are stronger than that of formal rules (Anderson, 2003).

However, there are no much literatures related to rural institutions to narrate that how rural population of Pakistan governing their day to day interactions? What are their priorities and which type of institutions they are prefer to overcome social issues or to achieve the overall goal of rural development?

### **1.2 Rural Institutional Structure in Pakistan**

Rural areas of Pakistan having strong ties of social setups in the shape of family, clan, biradarries as well as casts; all these promote harmony and integration among community members and develop the sense of closeness and brotherhood (Gazdar, 2007).

These units of social framework are responsible for actions and day to day matters of rural life, among these structures; family is the prime and fundamental to teach individuals about the wide range of governing principles of the community, and family is considered as first institution to teach rules and strategies to individual with respect to societal norms.

The family being a institution forming the basis for Kinship, clan or tribes, and formulates moral principles and customs within the traditional system to control individuals' behavior pattern and relations (Alavi, 1971). A strong dealing exist between the rural population, and these social relationships in the form of social capital further set local norms and customs, and allow people to access to power and other economic recourses (Dharmawan, 2001).

Kinship is considered the prime and important institution of social system; it keeps connected and active each members of the society in routine matters (Alavi, 1971). Under Kinship system individuals or groups are guided by the element of personal interest, values and religious doctrines, all these become sources to shape the behavior of individuals and group. In north Pakistan, Pukhtoon society itself is a complete institution, and moral code 'Pukhtoonwali' serve as ways for life and influence the social matter of Pukhtoon society (Gohar, 2007). The word Msharan (elders)in Pukhtoon society constitutes a system named Jirga, and Jirga being the board of elders influence the daily matters of rural Pukhtoon way of life (Taizi, 2007).

### **1.3 Review of New Institutional Economics (NIE)**

The New Institutional Economics (NIE) is an Economics standpoint that endeavors to extend the body of economic theory by focusing on the implication of non-market institutions (social, legislative principles) which underline economy related services as well as transaction costs (Malcolm, 2001). Basically, NIE is an attempt to integrate a theory of institutions into Economics (spring, 1992). One of the strong assumptions of Economics is that "human beings act rationally". The economists defined that Rational means to choose the best option when confronted with different options while in the utilization of scared resources.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Luce and Raiffa(1957) defined rationality in terms of game- theoretical perspective; rationality means to choose the right option from more than one available options which give opportunity to maximize outcome. In simple word, a person will select the best possible option from his/her list which cedes the high yielded outcomes for him/her.

Rationality does not explain that person does not make mistakes; however, the person shall not repeat the mistakes in their decisions (Downs, 1957). Individual rationality is limited by his neuro physical ability, limited knowledge and information; all these create hurdle and minimize the benefits as compared to the cost. Therefore, it is lucid that in presence of uncertainties, and bounded rationality of individuals; the need for institutions arises to help people to maximize the benefits over the cost and to keep the risks associated with decisions at minimal point. The other reasons to integrate institutional theories into economic system are the gains from economies of scale and externalities. So, it is for security as well as economic reasons that people prefer to trade commodities among individuals and groups; for smoothly run they need instrument and systemic structure.

#### **1.4 Concept of Institutions in NIE**

In the broad-spectrum, institution is a set of procedures and principles to govern individual as well as societal behaviors.<sup>2</sup> Basically, Institutions nurture human interactions, and most importantly to eliminate uncertainty by providing a structure to human life. Institutions are similar to "the rules of a game in a society" (North, 1990). It is a traditional outlook to define mankind a 'social animal' or to consider human being is 'instinct' to become part of a group.<sup>3</sup>The nature of mankind to join the social group and the necessity to trade and barter commodities among each other all these make institutions mandatory.

The key task of the institution is to ensure the element of certainty and smoothness by reducing uncertainty through the establishment of social rules and principles (Jutting and Soysa, 2006). "Institutions<sup>4</sup> are the constraints that human beings impose on human interaction" (North, 1995).North (1997, p.6) redefines institutions as "the rule of a game in a society" and through concept of rule and constraints, North clearly distinguish between formal and informal institutions.

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<sup>2</sup>Schultz (1968) has given this definition in his celebrated paper.

<sup>3</sup>See the discussion of traditional views by Olson (1965).

<sup>4</sup>North uses different terms for institutions e.g. rules and constraints. North (1990, 1991, and 1994) has used often formal and informal constraints instead of formal and informal rules, while North has not explained why he replaces word rule with constraints

Nevertheless, in 1991 Manig, explained that alone societal norms and rules are nothing to represent the institution, although institution reflect a system as societal rules. For further inquiry into institutions, there must be a clear difference among institutional functions, setups and structure.

## 2. Methodology and Field research Instruments

The study was conducted in district Swat, one of the conflict prone areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. It is situated about 177 km in the north of Islamabad. The total area of district Swat is 5,337 square kilometer (2,060, sq. miles). Topographically, Swat is a hilly area, and it is bordered by Chitral and Ghizar districts in the North, Kohistan and Shangla districts in the East, Malakand and Buner in the South and by the districts of Lower and Upper Dir in the west. The location of the city and hills allows Swat to experience pleasant weather in summer and severe cold weather in winter season.

The study is qualitative in nature which describes the perception, beliefs and nature of reality and truth about informal institutions' role in Swat conflict. Keeping in mind the objectives of the study the paper used both a mixture of quantitative and qualitative tools to understand the actual role of informal institutions in Swat Conflict. Using open ended and probing questions for in depth interviews the paper emphasized more on qualitative aspect of the study. The units of analysis of the study were households, Jumat (Mosque) and Jirga's leaders, the study using both basic and special surveys<sup>5</sup> collected the data about the role of informal institution in conflict.

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<sup>5</sup>Basic survey was the first phase of data collection which carried out by approaching concerned departments (union council offices and Police stations) and local inhabitants that gave exact information about number of households, Jirga leaders and Khans of the two villages. The purpose was to get basic information about households, Jirga system and Khan's role in the area. Basic survey questions were related to demographic characteristic of the respondents, and most importantly to know whether informal institution exists or not. The findings of basic survey identified the informal institutions, and highlighted the demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Special survey;The basic survey was followed by a subject specific survey called special survey, depending on the findings of the basic survey; all households were stratified according to relevant strata characteristics. The households from basic survey were stratified into Households (local people), Jirga leaders and Religious leaders (Imam). These strata were purposely designed to reveal the objectives of present study. Special survey using open ended and probing question carried out in depth interviews and FGDs with respondents. Special survey totally focused on role of informal institutions in Swat conflict. This survey investigated the role of informal institutions such as Jirga, Madrassa and Hujra role in Swat Conflict thoroughly.

Both basic and special surveys were carried out through self-designed open and close ended questionnaires. The study was conducted in two villages named Madayan and Tirat of district Swat. The selection was based on the criteria; firstly, these villages were more conflict prone spots<sup>6</sup> of the region. Secondly, there is higher degree of intensity of informal institutions' development and their interventions. The presence of important informal institutions e.g. Jirga, Jumat (Mosque) and Hujra (Community centre) in these villages and their intervention at local level are more visible as compared to settled areas of Swat. So it was more feasible to analyze the role of informal institutions in conflict situation through the selection of these villages. The household was a convenient tool for the study of research work.

The household which matches the Pakhtoon concept of **Kor**<sup>7</sup> was most suitable and convenient unit for the study. The head of the households of the selected sample were considered the main reference point for this purpose. In some cases, in the absence of household's head, eldest members e.g. eldest son or brother of the household's head were selected for interview and Focus group discussion. In depth interviews were conducted of respondents in two villages (Madayan and Tirat) which includes key informants e.g. Jirga leaders, local people, religious leaders from both villages. The main purpose of these in depth interviews was to investigate the role of informal institution in Swat Conflict.

All the respondents were asked open ended and probing questions regarding Jirga, Hujra and Madrassa's role in Swat Conflict. The questions highlighted informal institutions' role in Swat conflict deeply. 164 in depth interviews were carried out in the selected villages using purposeful stratified sampling techniques. Furthermore, three focus group discussions (FGD) were held in both selected villages for the purpose of deeply understand the role of informal institutions in conflict and to validate the qualitative data. In order to make the FGD discussions more meaningful and purposeful; the group size of the FGD was kept up to 10 persons in each FGD.

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<sup>6</sup>The consequences of the 'war on terror' which has been launched by United States of America and its alliances in Afghanistan just after September 11, 2001, were not only restricted in Afganistan. It spread across the broader and reached up to Swat. The whole district of Swat became the hub of militant, and in a very short time period administrative power of the district was fully controlled by militant. The government of Pakistan realized the severe situation, initially started negotiation with them through dialogue, when this attempt was failed, in early 2009 military operation was launched against militant. This was one of the severe violent conflicts in the history of Swat and it totally destroyed the social and economy of the region (ADB and WB, 2009).

The major discussions involved in the group were about the role of informal institution during Swat conflict. Respondents from all households in the targeted areas were men; due to the prevailing patriarchal Pukhtoon's social setup in the study area women are not allowed to go out to attend meetings and gatherings; in these areas the opinion of women are discussed by their family men. The study included women's opinions through their family's male members. The age of the respondents was 25- 70 years old; the head of the household were preferred because in Pukhtoon society elders having enough knowledge about day to day matters because the elders have to participate in social matters. As far as educational status of the respondents was considered 44 % were literate. As for as the occupational status of the respondents were considered 46% were engaged in daily wage earnings, 15 % were government employees such as school teachers. Class-fours and the rest were involved in agriculture and livestock sector.

The research did not study the control group to compare with the results of conflict driven area because of two reasons; first, it was not the objective of the research to do comparison study. Second, due to financial and time constraints the focus of the paper remained on informal institutions' role in Swat conflict. Furthermore; the study could not involve those personals who were directly involved in Swat conflict as militants. It was not possible; they were in the custody of Pakistani army, and no other persons were allowed to meet them.

### 3. Root Causes of Swat Conflict

Majority believe that the root cause of Swat conflict was Taliban who hijacked and exploited the local people's demand for **Nafaz-e-Shariat**<sup>8</sup> Taliban believed that government laws are not competent and fair in addressing social and administrative problems and they declared government system malevolent and vindictive. Therefore, Islamic law enforcement becomes mandatory. However, in both the villages people shared that Mullah Fazullah the main leader of Taliban in Swat and now the supreme leader of Tahrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) through his FM radio sermons mobilized local people of Swat toward militancy against government. Fazullah had succeeded to gain the support of large number of people including women who had donated their jewelry and precious ornaments to him in the name of Islam (Aziz, 2010).

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<sup>8</sup>Nafez-e-Sharait means the enforcement of Islamic Law

Local people also believed that prevailing decades social inequality, Khanism (influential families), high unemployment and government judicial weakness all these together fuelled the grievances of people of Swat (Rome, 2010). These factors have inseminated the ground of Swat with the militancy, and local people had joined the new system of Taliban with hope and expectation to do something better and well in the region (Hussain, 2013). The people explained that majority of deprived and poor people were exhausted from malicious acts of Khans, so the local people happily accepted militants, and joined them to fight against Khans.

#### **4. Informal Institutions Role in Swat Conflict**

The paper reveals that government of Pakistan brought **Swat conflict** into normal situation by military operation. The military operation against the militant has started in 2008; after three month rigorous battle against insurgents (Talibans). The key respondents shared those informal institutions which were considered in the past medium of reconciliation and peace could not support for maintaining peace in the region rather they supported and welcomed militant.

However, when household's heads were interviewed about the role of informal institutions in Swat conflict, majority of respondents almost 85 percent believed that informal institutions had paid their role in support of militant during the time of Taliban control. They explained that local Jumat (moques) and Madressah students were directly involved in militancy and they were killing local innocent people. They described that Mosques (Madressah) students were mobilized through Imams (religious leaders) to support the militants.

The elders of the community explained that local police had not that capacity to protect the Jirga leaders and Khans, and this was the basic reason that Taliban easily got the support from informal institutions. The key informant shared "in November, 2007, local people had struggled to establish the grant Jirgato conduct the bilateral negotiation with militant and government of Pakistan to settle down the conflict in Swat peacefully but it failed due to mistrust among the parties" (HRCP, 2010).

## 5. People Perception about Jirga Role in Swat Conflict

The institution of Jirga (elders' council) has vital role and influence in case of all kinds of conflict within Pukhtoon society, and has judicial, political, social and religious functions. To assess Jirga role in Swat conflict, when local people were interviewed that what kind of role Jirga had delivered at the time of Swat conflict? An overwhelming 80 percent of all respondents believed that Jirga people played positive role and opposed Taliban and militants' insurgencies in the region and tried to resolve the conflict through Jirga but failed due to mistrust among the parties.

They further explained that many times Jirga leaders had showed willingness to resolve the conflict through Jirga system but militants refused and threatened the leaders to behead and kill them. Jirga leaders described "Taliban killed 11 Jirga members in Matta village of Swat during militancy time". Taliban replaced Jirga leaders with Imam of the mosque and issued order to visit Imam for guidance and resolve issues". According to key informant Jirga leaders were totally silent and became neutral due to fears from Taliban and militants. The household heads explained that Taliban had not only destroyed the law and order situation but they had also controlled the social fabric and mechanism of the society.

Almost all FGD participants revealed that when, in village Tirat, community elders had called Jirga to negotiate with Taliban and militants to peacefully resolve the conflict; Taliban considered it as a **challenge** to their **writ** and instantly intimidated local elders to kill and murder. The elders further explained "government did not coordinate with community elders to maintain law and order situation neither government assured security of local elders those want to establish peace in the region".

In another FGD at Madiyan village, Jirga leaders explained that when Taliban leaders had got control over Madiyan village, "Taliban started killing elders and policemen". The community elders called Jirga of both locals and Taliban to stop the kills of innocent people. Taliban leaders became furious and announced that they would kill those people whom tried to challenge their writs. FGD participants further revealed that government police had run away from police stations, and there was no support from government to the local people. FGD participants shared that Taliban had killed almost 11 Jirga leaders at Matta Swat these were the situations that pushed Jirga leaders and locals to be silent, and forced them to be IDPs in Pakistan.

According almost all of the FGD participants, first militant had broken the fabric of informal institutions such as Jirga system and elders of the society, and killed those whom had opposed the ideology of Taliban. FGD participants shared “Taliban had made Mullahs<sup>9</sup> as an authority and representatives in the communities; they had issued order to visit them for guidance and to solve their problems. The household heads were of the views that militant had got the favor of local people that Taliban regime would provide speedy justice to the poor against Khans and influential elders. But militants very soon lost their support from the locals due to their cruelty and mean behaviors.

In Madiyan village, household heads shared “government’s failure made fertile the land of Swat for militants’ acts; local political representatives became silent and even did not visited Swat during Swat conflict. They did not talk against Taliban in parliaments due to fear and terror”. The respondents further explained that if government departments such as police, judiciary could run away; then how can local informal institutions and people spoke against Taliban? After military operation in Swat, the elders called local Jirga and decided to form **Lashkar**<sup>10</sup>with consultation of Pak Army. **Lashkar**, during operation helped Pak Army, and still **local Lashkar** is working with Pak Army for peace and stability in the region.

## 6. Perception on the Role of Madressah / Jumat in Swat Conflict

In Pakistan religious leadership has significant role and influence upon the politics and social life of the society as whole. So it was very important to take into account to fully understand the role of Madressah in Swat conflict; it is believed that the Madressah /Jumat had played major role in entire episode of Swat conflict. After 9/11, religious factors merged as dominant tool in conflict and crisis throughout the world. To study of Madressah/Jumat role in Swat conflict, households’ heads were interviewed about the role of Madressah/Jumat in Swat conflict. A significant numbers of Household heads (83 percent) believed that religious factors were main ingredients of Swat conflict, Mosques and Madressah served as platform for the stakeholders (Taliban) of the conflict.

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<sup>9</sup>Mullah means religiouscleric

<sup>10</sup>Lashkar is a volunteer force formed by Jirga leaders to fight against external treats.

They further explained that Madressah helped militants and were the main pillars of **TalibanFazullah structure**<sup>11</sup> in Swat. Madressah's students had joined Fazullah group, and they had facilitated him in fighting against locals and Pak Army. According to FGD participants in the mid of 1990s, Sufi Mohmummad and his son in law (Faz-ul-Ilah) had started the movement of TNSM from the Mosque of Dahre Swat<sup>12</sup>. Fazullah became Imam of **Dahre Mosque**, and started to mobilizethe local people through the channel of mosques and local FM radio in the region to join the movement of TNSM.

Fazullah and his group efficiently propogated the idea that the government of Pakistan and its constitution are not in accordance to Islamic laws, and had declared a war against government institutions and the people of Pakistan. Taliban started to gain the support and sympathy of locals. They had broadened their network in the whole district of Swat through different Imams of mosques. The FGD respondents further explained that almost all Madarass students and the local people who were from **deprived class** had joined Fazullah group.

However, these local people being part of Taliban were got huge money as well as social-status such as member of Taliban. The Jirga leaders revealed that **Imam** and **mosque** are the entities people trust and believed them. Taliban completely benefited from the elements of **trust** and **believe** that local people have on Imam and mosques, and motivated local youth to take rifles and knife to kill their own parents and brothers.

Imams of different mosques were also interviewed about Jumat/Madressah role in Swat conflict, they described that militancy in Swat was **political movement**; both **internal** and **external forces** were playing their game for their personal agenda and objectives. They further explained that it was true that religious leaders had started Nefaza-e- Shariat movement in early 1980s, and there was no violent act involved in that movement, later external forces with the help of internal elements hijacked the movement, and merged their own mission in it for the sake of political power, and used the religion as a tool.

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<sup>11</sup>Fazullah was the supreme Leader of Taliban in Swat and led Taliban in Swat conflict. Initially, he served as Imam in one the mosques in Swat.

<sup>12</sup>(Yusafzai 2009) explined" Sufi Muhammada a local cleric, on 28 June 1989, founded TNSM with a slogan of 'shariah or shahadat' ('Islamic law or martyrdom)'"

The FGD participants in Tirat village explained that Taliban had developed their own network of religious leaders, and they were interpreting Islamic laws in a particular way to legalize the acts of Fazullah and to influence local youth and people. The FGD participants further explained that Taliban had made Mosques and Madressah their centers; both local and outsiders Taliban were living in the Mosques and Madressahs. They had utilized the Mosque and Madressah for the purpose of fighting against the local and destruction of peace and security.

## 7. People's Perception about Hujra (Khan, Malik) Role in Swat Conflict

**Hujra system** is the main pillar of Pukhtoonwali, it provides opportunity for social gatherings, and most importantly serves as **Hall of village Council**; this acts as mediator to resolve family conflict, and it is considered as conflict resolutions centre. The study of Hujra is important to understand the relation of Hujra with Swat conflict. In Swat, Hujra is related to Khan and Malik and there is no common Hujra like in FATA and in other Pukhtoon region of Pakistan. So the locals are using Khan's Hujra for meetings and conflict resolution purposes.

To study Hujra's role in conflict households were interviewed about **Khan's** role in Swat conflict. Almost all household heads (95 percent) believed that in the initial stage **Khan** called a Jiraga of local elders at his Hujra to discuss the security issues and to form **Lashkar**<sup>13</sup> against Taliban. They further explained that as a result of Khan's Jirga Taliban became livid and attacked on Khan's family, killed his son and demolished Khan's Hujra.

As a result Khans migrated from Swat. It was highlighted by FGD participants that **Khans** were against the Taliban and wanted to support the Government to abolish the menace terrorism from Swat. But local police could not ensure the protection of Khans, so due to fear **Hujra System** had become silent and neutral at the time of Swat conflict. The participants of FGD in Tirat village further revealed that those **Khans** and **locals** tried to combat the terrorism act in Swat; they were killed brutally by Taliban.

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<sup>13</sup>Volunteer force to combat external insurgencies

## Conclusion

The Violent conflict of Swat, in the years of 2007-2009 was the conflict generated by Taliban and extremists groups. The study reveals the major root cause of Swat conflict was based on the demand of local people for **Nafaz-e- Shariat**, the militant had hijacked this movement, and on the base of Nafez-e- Sharait militant started violence in the region to make stronger their writ. The prevailing decades social inequality, Khanism (influential families), high unemployment and government judicial weakness all these together fuelled the grievances of people of Swat. These factors have inseminated the ground of Swat with the militancy, and local people had joined the new system of Taliban with hope and expectation to do something better and well in the region.

Nevertheless, the informal institutions such as **Jirga, Jumat, and Khans** played their role differently at the time of Swat violent conflict. Jirga (the elders' assembly), in order to control conflict, played positive role during violent conflict of Swat and had tried to resolve the conflict. Whereas, it is clear that religious factors were main ingredients of Swat conflict, mosques and Madressah served as platform for the stakeholders (Taliban) of Swat conflict. The study further explained that Madressah helped militants and served as the main pillars of **Taliban Fazullah structures** in Swat. Madressah students had joined Fazullah group and facilitated them in fighting against locals and Pak Army.

Militants developed their own network of religious leaders those interpreted Islamic teachings for their personnel interest. It is difficult to gage the level of the support which Jumat and Madressh have paid to the militant, however, it is argued that mosques and Madressahs fully supported the militant to destabilize peace situation in the region. Keeping in view the key findings of the study the researcher suggests that Government must formulate competent laws to govern the malicious activities of Jumat, Madrassah and those religious parties who act like their patronage. Furthermore, Government formulate such policies which make accountable the public judiciary, police system and other law enforcement agencies. Government should take notice of the incompetency of government institutions and prejudice systems for the betterment of people and society as whole.

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