Review of the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: The Reality in the Context of International Relations
Junghoon Lee

The first nuclear crisis of 1993-94 on the Korean peninsula culminated not in military confrontation, but rather in diplomatic engagement and the establishment of a series of historical agreements: by the Agreed Framework of October 1994, the U.S. government promised to offer DPRK two light water reactors (LWRs) in place of the graphite reactor in Yongbyon, and more importantly, the full normalization of relations in the near future; in March 1995, the U.S., Japan and South Korea established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Furthermore, North Korea and the U.S. initiated high-level talks on nuclear nonproliferation and normalization. Indeed, the order in Northeast Asia seemed to be on the verge of a peaceful and fundamental reconfiguration. However, yet the promise of rapprochement proved to be only short-lived, and the U.S.-North Korean relations have returned to the state of protracted antagonism that has prevailed since the Korean War. North Korea argues that the only way to resolve the tension on the Korean peninsula is to rebuild their relationship directly with the US. The U.S., however, favors the inclusion of the wider international community in the multilateral approach, to bring about change in the region. The tensions will continue unabated as long as North Korea insists upon its particular logic to solve the regional conflict.

Full Text: PDF     DOI: 10.15640/jgpc.v4n2a2